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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs-

No. 10401

JACK YOUNGLOVE,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Jack Younglove, appeals from a determination under Title 77, Chapter 60, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, adjudicating him to be the father of the bastard child
of Betty Wallberg.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged by information with bastardy
in violation of Section 77-60-1, Utah Code Annotated,
1953. It was alleged that on or about the 10th day of Febru;11y, 1964, Betty Wallberg, an unmarried female, became
pregnant and that Jack Younglove, the appellant, was the
father of the child subsequently born. Trial was held on
March 22, 1965, before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson,
Judge, sitting with a jury. The appellant was found guilty
of being th<" father of the bastard child of Betty Wallberg.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State of Utah submits that the adjudication of the
appellant as the natural father of the child of Betty Wallberg should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of facts:
Betty Wallberg, a widow with six prior children, met Jack
Younglove on or about the 4th day of January, 1964, at the
Ute Bar at South Temple and Second West streets in Salt
Lake City ( R. 34) . Mrs. Wallberg was employed as a barmaid at the Ute Bar. She testified that she went out with
Younglove approximately five days after she met him (R.
34). Mrs. Wallberg testified that she had sexual intercourse with the appellant several times during the month
of January (R. 35). She further testified that she had her
last menstral cycle from the 27th of January, 1964, until the
first day of February, 1964, and thereafter, had no other
menstral period until the birth of her child. Mrs. Wallberg
indicated that she had sexual intercourse with Younglove
several times during February of 1964 (R. 38). She stated
that she had almost daily intercourse with the appellant
between the 15th day of February and the 15th day of
March, 1964 ( R. 38) . She testified that she did not engage
in sexual intercourse with any other man during the same
period or go out with any other male companion (R. 39)
In November, 1964, Mrs. Wallberg gave birth to an eight
pound six ounce baby boy ( R. 39--40) .
On the 3rd or 4th of March, 1964, the appellant acknowledged that Mrs. Wallberg had not had her mrnstral
period. In July of 1964, the appellant and Mrs. Wallberg
had a conversation wherein Younglove indicated that he
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wantf'.d to make some arrangements to marry Mrs. Wallberg ( R. 45). Subsequently, in August of 1964, the appellant learned that Mrs. Wallberg had obtained welfare and
in<licated that because of that, he would deny paternity
(R. 46) . At the time Mrs. Wall berg obtained welfare and
entered the County Hospital to give birth to her child, she
listed Jack Younglove as her husband and father of the
child (R. 54).
The appellant, Jack Younglove, testified that he was
married and had three children. He admitted meeting
Betty Wallberg on January 5, 1964, at the Ute Bar (R. 62).
The appellant admitted taking Betty Wallberg home the
first night he met her (R. 63). The appellant further admitted being in Salt Lake City from January 20, 1964, to
the 2nd day of March, 1964, and returning to Salt Lake
City on March 15, 1964, after having left the State (R. 6465). The appellant admitted taking Mrs. Wallberg home
srveral times during the month of January, 1964, the last
time being on January 20, 1964 ( R. 71). The appellant
denied any discussions concerning marrying Mrs. Wallberg (R. 67). The appellant testified as to meeting Betty
Wallberg in the Ute Bar, seeing her in the company of
other men and taking her home on a number of occasions
(R. 62, 63), and testifying further that he had helped her
move on two occasions ( R. 70). On cross-examination, the
appellant \Vas asked if he had ever had sexual intercourse
\1ith Mrs. Wallberg on any of the nights he took her home.
Thr appellant refused to answer on the grounds that it
might incriminate and disgrace him (R. 72). The trial
court overruled the objection and the appellant admitted
having intercourse with Mrs. Wallberg in January of 1964
on each occasion that he took her home (R. 75).
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Based upon the above facts, the jury returned a verdict
finding that the appellant was the father of the bastard
child of Betty Wall berg.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE
PROSECUTION TO QUESTION THE APPELLANT REGARDING HIS BURGLARY CONVICTION.

At the time of the appellant's trial and after his direct
examination, the prosecution asked the following questiom
of the appellant (R. 71):

"Q (Mr. Winder) Have you ever been convicted of a
felony, Mr. Younglove?
A Yes.
Q What felony?
A Burglary.
Q Where?
A Salt Lake.
Q The date of your conviction?
MR. MARTINEAU: Your Honor, I object to that
as irrelevant and material, the date of it.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
MR. MARTINEAU: May I have an exception, h_c
is trying to get in through the back door through this
line of questions what he was unable to elicit with the
other question.
THE COURT: What is your answer?
A Box 250, Draper, Utah.
Q (Mr. Winder) What is the date you were committed or sentenced?
A December 18, 1964."

s
The appellant contends that the above cross-examination
was error, relying upon State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287
Pac. 909 (1930) and State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 110 Pac.
434 ( 1910). Neither of these cases support the appellant's
position and substantial subsequent precedent from this
court supports the trial court's ruling that the questions
asked by the prosecution were proper under the circumstances. The appellant's contention is apparently that the
prosecution asked the appellant the details and circumstances surrounding his conviction. This, of course, is not
true at all. The only questions asked were the type of crime,
where it occurred, and the date of the conviction. This is in
no way going into the details and factual circumstances of
the crime. In State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 206 Pac. 717
(1922), this court recognized that it was permissible to inquire as to the nature of the crime, whether it was burglary,
larceny, etc. Numerous courts have upheld allowing the
time and place of the conviction, since this is directly relevant to determining the witness's present veracity. A crime
many years prior may have little effect for impeachment
purposes. McCormick, Evidence, p. 92 ( 1954); Hadley
v. State, 25 Ariz. 23, 212 Pac. 458 ( 1923). In State v.
Hougenson, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229 (1936), this court
')bservecl that any witness may be asked on cross-examination whether he has been convicted of a felony. In State v.
Dickson, 12 U.2d 8, 361P.2d412 ( 1961), this court stated:
"The trial court properly indicated the view that the
def encl ant could be questioned about such convictions
and as to the number and type of crimes involved for
the purpose of impeaching his credibility as a witness."
In State v. Kazda, 14 U.2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 ( 1963), this

court observed:
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"Also assigned as error is the cross-examination of the
defendant as to convictions. It was elicited upon cro~s
examination that the defendant had several prior
felony convictions, unrelated to the instant charge, and
he maintains that this amounted to a general assault
upon his character and thus constituted prejudicial
error. This is also without merit. When an accuscrl
voluntarily takes the witness stand he may be askerl
whether or not he has ever been convicted of a felony.
Such a question is sanctioned by statute. If thf' accused
answers in the affirmative, he may be asked the natme
of the felony. Further, the accused may be asked if he
has been convicted of more than one felony, and if so,
the type or nature thereof.
The apparent purpose and reason for permitting the
prosecution to question the accused regarding prim
felony convictions is to affect his credibility as a witness.
However, the details or circumstances surrounding thr
felony or felonies for which the accused was convicted
may not be inquired into except under unusual circumstances, when the inquiry would tend to show a scheme,
plan, modus operandi, or the like. In the instant case.
the details of the prior felony convictions were not
asked of the defendant."
Thus, it is apparent that the rule in Utah is that more may
be inquired into than just a conviction of a felony and that
the limiting provisions of the Vance case are no longer applicable. In the instant case, it is apparent that the questions of the prosecution did not exceed the bounds of propriety and did not purport to go into the facts and detaib
of the crime. The appellant was in no way prejudiced. Tl:e
argument on appeal that reversal is required cannot be
sustained.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN COMPELLING THE
APPELLANT TO ANSWER QUESTIONS RELATING TO
WHETHER HE HAD HAD SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITH
THE rROSECUTRIX, WHERE HE WAS CHARGED WITH
B\STARDY AND WHERE HE VOLUNTARILY TOOK THE
STAND AND TESTIFIED TO ASSOCIATIONS WITH THE
PROSECUTRIX AT THE TIME WHEN THE CONCEPTION
WAS TO HA VE TAKEN PLACE.

After the prosecution rested, the appellant voluntarily
took the stand. He testified to meeting Mrs. Wallberg on
January 5, 1964, at the Ute Bar and admitted taking her
home on that night. The appellant further admitted being
in Salt Lake City from January 20 to the 2nd day of March,
1964, and thereafter, leaving for a short time and returning
on March 15, 1964. The appellant admitted taking Betty
Wallberg home several times and being in her company on
numerous occasions. The appellant denied making any of
the admissions Mrs. Wallberg claimed he made when she
testified. The appellant also admitted helping Mrs. Wallberg move on two occasions. The whole scope of his testimony involved the period between January 5, 1964, when
he met Betty Wallberg, to the time of the birth of her baby.
Although at no time on direct examination did the appellant expressly deny being the father of Mrs. Wallberg's
child, or having had intercourse with her, the nature of his
testimony was such that implicit in it was a claim of inno:ence to the charge. No jury, had the case been left where
11
was af1er the appellant had testified, could have concludrcl nthenvise than that the appellant had denied his
11
''.' 1t of the offense charged and his involvement with Mrs.
\\ .:illherg, at kast to the extent that his being the father
other basta1 cl child was in issue.
The appellallt contends that since he did not expressly
11 1
't fy on the is';ue of sexual intercourse he could not have

8
been compelled on cross-examination to testify, since this
would violate his rights against self-incrimination. It is
submitted that this proposition is without merit.
FEDERAL CASES

The appellant contends, and properly so, that since the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 ( 1964), that the privileges existing
under the Federal Constitution which allow a defendant in
a criminal case to refuse to be compelled to give incriminating evidence are applicable to the State's. However, there
is nothing in the Malloy case which indicates that where a
defendant in a criminal or civil proceeding takes the stand
and gives testimony on direct examination he may not be
cross-examined into all aspects of the case. Indeed, the
federal rule is exactly the opposite, as is the rule generally
throughout the United States. McCormick, Evidence, page
274 (1954) states:
"An ordinary witness has no privilege to decline altogether to testify and by taking the stand, he waives
nothing. He has a choice only when he is asked an incriminating question. The accused is in a vastly different position. He has an option to stay off the stanrl
altogether, or to testify. As his privilege is wider, so
correspondingly his waiver is wider, than that of the
ordinary witness who answers an incriminating question. By volunteering to become a witness, he volun·
teered to answer all relevant inquiries about the charge
against him which is on trial."
8 Wigmore, Evidence, McNaughton Revision, 1961, Sec·
tion 2276, page 459 notes the same rule:
"The case of an accused in a criminal trial who voluntarily takes the stand is a special case. Here, the pri,i-
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Jege has been construed t? protect h.im from bei1:1g required to answer even a smgle question* * *. His voluntary offer of testimony on any fact is a waiver as to
all other relevant facts, because of the necessary connection between all."
The reason for the rule is clearly set forth in the same section of Wigmore's work:
"Any voluntary disclosure by the accused, except in the
most unlikely situation, distorts the probative picture.
The application of a rule of waiver to an accused, it
should be noted, is at least as fair as its application to
an ordinary witness. The accused has the choice at the
outset, unhurried and with full knowledge that all
questions will relate to his incrimination, whereas the
ordinary witness is compelled to take the stand in the
first instance and his opportunity for choice does not
come until later when, perhaps by surprise and without clear portent, some part of an incriminating fact is
asked for.
The result is, then, that the accused, as to all facts
whatever (except those which merely impeach his
credit and therefore are not directly related to the
charge in issue) , has signified his waiver by the initial
act of taking the stand. Moreover, the reasons advanced for the privilege ( ~ 2251 supra) are decisively
less persuasive when applied to disclosures requested
after the accused has voluntarily taken the stand."
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court and
rnher federal courts clearly support the statements made in
~\'igmore and McCormick. See Rogge, The First and The
hfth, page 194 ( 1960).

, In Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 180 ( 1887), the United
Statrs Supreme Court recognized that when an accused
takes the stand, he becomes subject to cross-examination on
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all issues of relevance to the charges against him. Thr
court stated:
"We come now to consider the objection that the clefendant Spies was compelled by the court to be a 11irness against himself. He voluntarily offered himself"'
a witness in his own behalf, and by so doing, he became
bound to submit to a proper cross-examination under
the law and practiced in the jurisdiction where he 11a'
being tried."
Subsequently, in Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 30-!
( 1900), the Supreme Court again passed upon the issue.
The court stated:
"Error is also assigned in not restricting the cross-examina tion of the plaintiff in error. Defrndant himself
was the only witness put upon the stand by the defense,
who was connected with the transaction; and he 1rns
asked but a single question, and that related to his
whereabouts upon the night of the murder. To this h~
answered: 'I was up between Clancy's and Kennedy's.
I had been in Clancy's up to about half-past twelve 01
one o'clock-about one o'clock, I guess. I went up to
Kennedy's and had a few drinks with Captain Wallace
and Billy Kennedy, and I told them I was getting kind
of full and I was going home, and along about quarter
past one Wallace brought me down about as far as
Clancy's and then he took me down to the cabin and
left me in the cabin, and we wound the alarmclorkaml
set it to go off at six o'clock, and I took off my shoes and
lay down on the bunk and woke up at six o'clock in the
morning, and went up the street.'
'

I

On cross-examination the government wa.~ pcrrrnw·u
over the objection of defendant's counsel, to ask qur<tions relating to the witness's attire on the night uf the
shooting, to his acquaintance with Corbett, '' h_rtk:
Corbett had shoes of a certain kind, whether witrn'''
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saw Corbett on the evening of March 12, the night p~e
ceding the shooting, w~ethe: Corbett roomed. with
Fitzpatrick in the latter s cabm, and whether witness
say any one else in the cabin besides Brooks and
Corbett. The court permitted this upon the theory
that it was competent for the prosecution to show every
movement of the prisoner during the night, the character of his dress, the places he had visited and the
company he had kept.
Where an accused party waives his constitutional
privilege of silence, takes the stand in his own behalf
and makes his own statement, it is clear that the
prosecution has a right to cross-examine him upon such
statement with the same latitude as would be exercised
in the case of an ordinary witness, as to the circumstances conecting him with the alleged crime."
In Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 ( 1912), the
United States Supreme Court observed:
"Thus, if the witness, himself, elects to waive his privilege, as he may doubtless do, his privilege is for his protection and not for that of other parties and discloses
his criminal connections, he is not permitted to stop,
but must go on and make a full disclosure." (citing
numerous cases)
In Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943), Mr.
.lustice Douglas, speaking for the court, stated:
''The case of an accused who voluntarily takes the stand
and the case of an accused who refrains from testifying
!Bruno v. United States 308 US 287 84 Led 257 60
s, c,t 198) are of course' vastly different.
'
Raff el' v.
11
~; \ed States, 271 US 494, Led 1054, 46 S Ct ~66 .
. ~ \o]untary offer of testimony upon any fact is a
"aiver as to all other relevant facts, because of the
necessary connection between all.' 8 Wigmore Evicle11ce. '.-ld ed. 1940, ~ 2276(2). And see Fitzp~trick

yo
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v. United States, 178 US 304, 315, 316, 44 L cd Jr:.
1083, 1084, 20 S Ct 944; Powers v. United Sta tr' n:
US 303, 314, 56 Led 448, 452, 32 S Ct 281."
, -See also Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 ( 1951 ).
Numerous lesser federal courts have, of course, foll011rd
the Supreme Court's direction. In Caminetti v. Unitcd
States, 220 F. 545 (9th Cir. 1915), aff'd 242 U.S. 4/ii
( 1915), the defendant took the stand and testified onh tn
part of the facts which were in the nature incriminatin~
and then refused to go further. It was determined that k
failure to go further operated as a waiver so far as his pri1.ilege to have the prosecution refrain from commenting upo11
his failure to explain various facts. Numerous cases at·
cited in Wigmore, supra, Section 2276, from both state anti
federal jurisdictions, supporting the above rule. A similct
position has been taken under the Uniform Rules of fo
dence, Rule 25 ( g). Certainly, therefore, under the gencr.1:
rule of federal law, the appellant having taken the stanrl
and testified on his own behalf was subject to cross-examination on all issues relevant to the charges against him
Further, the appellant made incriminating statemfrtt'
when he acknowledged being with the prosecuting fem;ilc
in January of 1965 and admitted taking her home, sinC'
according to Mrs. vVallberg, many of the acts of sc\nal
intercourse took place in the parking lot adjacent to h··r
apartment. By not allowing full cross-examination, th•
jury could only be mislead because of the nature of ih··
appellant's testimony to the whole picture of his guilt.
FEDERAL CASES (Cited by Appellant)
The appellant in his brief has cited several cases fro~ the
.
Umted
States Supreme Court an d 1owcr f cdera 1 J·unsdic-
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for the proposition that an accused taking the stand
ho does not testify as to incriminating facts cannot be
cross-examined into facts which may tend to incriminate
him. The cases cited by the appellant in no way support
the proposition which appellant urges. Emspak v. United
States. 349 U.S. 190 ( 1955) involved a situation where a
Jahor union official was summoned to testify before a congressional investigating committee and involved the question of waiver of the privilege of self-incrimination before
th~t committee. This is a substantially different situation
than where an accused in a criminal trial voluntarily takes
the stand.
Sherman v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1961),
involved a proceeding before the District Director of Immigration and Naturalization for enforcement of an administrative subpoena. The witness who testified was not the
witness under investigation but an informative witness for
tl1t purposes of the inquiry. Further, the court ruled that
since the witness was unfamiliar with the nature of the procmlings, he could not have waived his right to self-incrimiuation. The case has no precedent in the instant fact situation.
Isaacs v. United States, 256 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1958),
in\'olvcd a case where a witness was called before a grand
jury investigation. It did not involve a situation where a
rl~frnclant in a criminal trial takes the stand in his own
tiun'
,1

behalf.

In United States v. Toner, 173 F.2d 140 (3rd Cir. 1949),
the is,ue rai5ed was of a witness not the accused testifying
<\S to incriminating facts. This case is of no precedential
:· ahi:' in thr case of an accused voluntarily taking the stand
l!1 Ins own behalf \Vigmore supra Section 2276 · Mc('
'
'
'
'
~urrnJCk. supra, page 274.
'.
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Finally, the appellant cites the case of the Uniter/ Stair·
v. Hoag, 142 F. Supp. 667 (D. C. 1956). ThatcisrdL·
involved a refusal to testify before a Senate permanent ~ub
committee on investigation and is irrelevant to the instant
case. Therefore, not one of the cases cited by the appellant
supports the proposition for which it was urged.
UTAH CASES

The appellant seeks to draw special comfort from thr
Utah statutes and cases. It is admitted, of course, that the
Utah Constitution contains a provision prohibiting com·
pelling a defendant to give evidence against himself. Articlr
I, Section 12, Constitution of the State of Utah. Section
77-1-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that an
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence again11
himself, and Section 77-24-9, Utah Code Annotated, 11111
provides that a witness need not give an answer to a question which will have a tendency to subject him to punishment for a felony or degrade his character, unless it is t~r
very fact in issue. In the instant case, of course, the appc1·
lant's paternity is the very fact in issue.
The appellant seeks to rely upon State v. Shorklc)', ~9
Utah 25, 80 Pac. 865 ( 1905); State v. Vana, 38 Utah I.
110 Pac. 434 (1910); State v. Thorne, 39 Utah 208, Jli
Pac. 58 ( 1911). Appellant has also cited other Utah Gl"'i
the relevance of which is doubtful, as will be demonstrattil
The case of State v. Shockley, supra, is not in point ll'idi
the instant case. In the Shockley case, the court held·'
reversable error to permit the State to question the ddrnd·
ant on cross-examination respecting the commission Ly him
of other crimes in no wise connected with the crime foi
which he was on trial.
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Jn thr case of State v. Vance, supra, the defendant was

·:hargccl with three counts of murder joined together. The

special fact situation surrounding the alleged murder which
11 as joined in three duplicitous counts is important to understanding the rnling of the court on appeal. The defendant
was charged with killing his wife ( 1) by beating, kicking
and bruising and ( 2) by poison. Further, he was charged
11ith killing his wife by poison and beating, bruising and
kicking her. At the time of trial, the defendant took the
,(and and testified only with reference to the poisoning. No
cvidmce of any kind was given relating to any beating or
kicking. On cross-examination, the prosecutor was allowed
to go into the issue of the kicking or beating. The Vance case
discusses the scope of cross-examination more with referencP to that rule prohibiting examination beyond direct
testimony than it does the constitutional issue, which is
raised before the court in the instant appeal. In any event,
the court felt that there was sufficient facts where the defrndant testified with reference to the poison in the house
to allow full inquiry on cross-examination into the question
of tbe use of poison. On the issue of the beating, the court
noted:
"Appellant had neither directly or indirectly denied,
~1or ,i,n any way negatived his connection with the beatmg.
Th(' Va nee case, to the extent that it indicates that the
majority rule, prohibits inquiry of a defendant on the basis
ul self-incrimination beyond the specific matter testified to
'Jn direct examination is in error, Wigmore, supra. To the
rxtFrH that the Va nee case acknowledges California aur1
·
111
•.tel)
"'supporting its position, it is equally in error. (See
Pirplr v. Atchley, 53 Cal. 2d 160, 346 P.2d 764; People v.
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Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505), nor" as tlir ruk
different at the time the Vance case was decided. ,\;\('(, \\'ir:.
more, supra, Section 2276. What the Vance case sPems to
be saying is that cross-examination of a ddrnclant cannot
exceed the scope of direct examination. Further, since thr
defendant in the instant case most certainly indirC'cth
denied his association with the crime chargf'.d ( 1) by lcJ1·
ing in the jury's mind the implication that he clid not ha11,
intercourse with Mrs. Wallberg during his association 11ith
her and ( 2) in denying the admissions that l\lrs. Wallbf1~
testified the defendant made, it is apparent that e\'en undu
the Vance rule, the defendant could be cross-examined as
was done in this case.
In State v. Thorne, supra, this court stated:
"The rule obtains in this jurisdiction that a clcfrndant
in a criminal case, becoming a witness, may he cro1i·
examined the same as any other \vitness. He, like an;
other witness, may be asked many q11C'.stions 11holil
irrelevant and collateral to the issue, for the purpo1r·
of testing his memory, affecting his creclibilitv, and th 1
weight of his testimony. When a question is asked
which relates to incriminating acts, or calls for en
dence of an incriminating character, separate and d1 1·
tinct from those on trial or testified to bv him. he, lih
any other \vitncss, may claim the privilc_ge and dcclinr ,
to answer it."
The key phrase "separate and distinct from thoc;c on trial'
makes it obvious that the Thorne case does not support tl 11•
narrow proposition urged for it by the ap1wllant. Th 11 '·
under the rule of State v. Thorne, supra, the ruling of the
trial court in the instant case was clearly proper.
01
· v. Young, 97 Utah 29 I. ocjJ•lj
T h e case of Sadlczr
o 1 · r ''
( 1938), cited in the appellant's brief, docs not ~upport ii"
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proposition m.~crl for reversal. That case ~eld that a ~rose
cutina,., \1·itness could not be asked questions about mtercomse with the clefrnclant on dates other than that charged
:n thr information, since to do so would be to violate her
pri\·ilege against self-incrimination. This is a distinct proposition from thr question of the defendant's privilege when
hr takes the stand ancl testifies on the very fact in issue.
State y Reese, 41 Utah 447, 135 Pac. 270 ( 1913), also
cited by the appellant, is not relevant to the issue now before
the court, since that case dealt with a "witness's" right to be
fret' from degrading questions. The case now on appeal invoh'rs the appellant's right not to be compelled to give evidence agamst himself.
The brtter reasoned cases hold that in bastardy proceedings a party or other witness who testifies without invoking
the pri\·ilege against self-incrimination waives his constitutional rights, 72 A.L.R.2cl 852.

In Norfolk v. Ga)'lord, 28 Conn. 309 ( 1859), the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that where the defendant in
a bastarclv suit gave evidence in chief indicating that he had
no illicit intercourse with the mother of the child he was
'
bound to answer every inquiry relating to the subject
in
issue on cross-examination. The court stated:
":\ witne-;s is not to be compelled to testify to any matter,
when his testimony may expose him to a criminal
~har~e or prnal liability. But if he voluntarily testifies
m ch 1ef, hr \\ aives his privilege, and must submit to
the. consequent cross-examination, however penal in
their co11sequC'nces his answers may become***. The
rrason of the rule and its limitation is too obvious to
rcquirr ducidation.''

. It \ionlcl be a mockrry of justice for the defendant to be
~,\kJ\\rd
· testimony,
·
· im·
- lo tak
' c th e stanc,I give
t h eon 1y f air
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plication of which is that he was not guilty of thr charges
against him, and then, when subjected to cross-examination, he allowed to stand upon a privilege against self.
incrimination. The rule simply does not sustain the appellant's position; neither does reason nor logic. U ncler these
circumstances, it is apparent that the appellant has no bas~
for relief from the judgment imposed against him.

CONCLUSION
The appellant was given a full and fair hearing in the
trial court and determined to be the father of the illigiti·
mate child of Betty Wallberg. The contentions raised on
appeal are at best without merit. The prosecutor's cross·
examination of the appellant concerning his conviction of
a felony was proper, and the scope of cross-examination did
not exceed the bounds of propriety. The appellant's asser·
tion that his constitutional rights against self-incrimination
were violated is obviously not supported by federal or state
case law. This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General

